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Background: In an effort to eliminate dengue, a successful technology was developed 
with the stable introduction of the obligate intracellular bacteria Wolbachia pipientis 
into the mosquito Aedes aegypti to reduce its ability to transmit dengue fever due to 
life shortening and inhibition of viral replication effects. An analysis of risk was required 
before considering release of the modified mosquito into the environment.
Methods: Expert knowledge and a risk assessment framework were used to identify 
risk associated with the release of the modified mosquito. Individual and group expert 
elicitation was performed to identify potential hazards. A Bayesian network (BN) was 
developed to capture the relationship between hazards and the likelihood of events 
occurring. Risk was calculated from the expert likelihood estimates populating the BN 
and the consequence estimates elicited from experts.
results: The risk model for “Don’t Achieve Release” provided an estimated 46% like-
lihood that the release would not occur by a nominated time but generated an overall 
risk rating of very low. The ability to obtain compliance had the greatest influence on 
the likelihood of release occurring. The risk model for “Cause More Harm” provided a 
12.5% likelihood that more harm would result from the release, but the overall risk was 
considered negligible. The efficacy of mosquito management had the most influence, 
with the perception that the threat of dengue fever had been eliminated, resulting in less 
household mosquito control, and was scored as the highest ranked individual hazard 
(albeit low risk).
conclusions: The risk analysis was designed to incorporate the interacting complexity 
of hazards that may affect the release of the technology into the environment. The risk 
analysis was a small, but important, implementation phase in the success of this inno-
vative research introducing a new technology to combat dengue transmission in the 
environment.
Keywords: impact assessment, dengue, Wolbachia, Aedes aegypti, release, risk analysis
Abbreviations: BN, Bayesian network; CMH, Cause More Harm; CPT, conditional probability table; DAR, Don’t Achieve 
Release; GCGH, Grand Challenges in Global Health; GMO, genetically modified organism; OGTR, Office of the Gene 
Technology Regulator.
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inTrODUcTiOn
Dengue remains a priority for public health authorities across the 
globe. The viral disease is transmitted primarily by the mosquito 
Aedes aegypti (Ae. aegypti), which also transmits a number of 
other viruses, including yellow fever and chikungunya viruses 
(1, 2). An estimated 390 million dengue infections occur annually 
as the virus expands into new geographic regions and affects both 
urban and rural settings (3, 4). Dengue is not considered endemic 
in Australia, and dengue activity is currently limited to some 
parts of Queensland, where Ae. aegypti is present (5, 6). In the 
absence of a vaccine, management of dengue comprises vector 
management and reduction of human exposure to mosquito bites 
through the use of repellents and behavioral modification (7). 
However, outbreaks still occur as a result of the repeated reintro-
duction of the virus through infected overseas travelers visiting or 
returning to Australia, especially during summer months.
Aedes aegypti females are responsible for transmitting dengue 
viruses between humans. However, the mosquito must first 
acquire the virus from a viremic individual through a blood 
meal. While Ae. aegypti is African in origin, it is now distributed 
in many tropical and subtropical regions across the globe. It is 
almost always associated with human habitats. Larval develop-
ment most commonly occurs in artificial water containers, such 
as pot plant bases, discarded tires, and water tanks (8, 9), or 
natural containers, such as fallen palm fronds and coconut husks. 
The potential for larval production can be high, especially within 
urban centers of developing countries, where domestic water 
storage in containers is common (10, 11).
Wolbachia are obligate intracellular endosymbiotic bacteria 
found naturally in a wide range of invertebrates, including some 
species of mosquitoes, but not Ae. aegypti (12, 13). Wolbachia are 
maternally transmitted to the next generation through the eggs, 
infect reproductive tissues, and manipulate the host reproductive 
cycle to increase their spread (14–16). Reproductive strategies 
associated with Wolbachia infection include parthenogenesis, 
male killing or feminization, sex-ratio distortions (17–19), and 
cytoplasmic incompatibility (20, 21), which effectively reduce 
the ability for the dengue virus to infect other hosts by blocking 
virus replication (2). Many years of field-based and laboratory 
studies have resulted in the successful introduction of at least 
two Wolbachia strains (wMel and wMelPop-CLA strain) to Ae. 
aegypti populations [see Ref. (22) for details].
As part of a larger international project to reduce the incidence 
of dengue fever in Australia and elsewhere around the world, a 
trial field release of Wolbachia-infected Ae. aegypti was proposed 
for the 2010/11 wet season in far North Queensland, Australia. 
The biosafety of proposed release was assessed and approved by 
the Australian Government (23). This was the first time such a 
release had been considered and a key element in securing per-
mission was the analysis of risks associated with the release. Thus, 
all elements of risk associated with the release of Ae. aegypti con-
taining Wolbachia into naturally occurring populations needed 
to be identified and investigated before the release was approved 
to ensure that the field release would “cause no more harm” 
than that posed by natural Ae. aegypti populations. The novelty 
of the project meant that there were limited empirical data and 
subsequently high levels of uncertainty surrounding the potential 
for negative impacts. Where historical data relevant to assessing 
risk are lacking, elicitation of expert knowledge is an appropriate 
proxy for empirical data and is often used to address uncertainties 
in knowledge assumptions and limited datasets (24). Because of 
the novelty of the system, and potentially wide-ranging effects 
on individuals and communities in release areas, and in order 
to ensure transparency in the process, non-technical community 
experts were involved in the elicitation of risk estimates as well 
as technical experts.
Risk assessments are standard practice in many business 
practices and operational procedures of organizations today. 
A risk analysis determines the likelihood of an event occurring 
and the consequences of an event if it does occur. The level of risk 
is calculated from the product of the likelihood and consequence. 
A risk assessment needs measures to incorporate feedback oppor-
tunities to improve predictions and reduce uncertainty (25, 26).
The results of the risk analysis described herein were used to 
determine the approval of the proposed release. To assess the 
risk associated with the proposed release, two risk end points 
(undesirable states of a system) were considered. Here, we 
describe the tools, process, and methodology used in the risk 
analysis to identify and assess potential hazards of releasing 
Ae. aegypti mosquitoes containing a strain of Wolbachia into 
a naturally occurring population. We also describe the results 
of the risk analysis, including discussion of the specific hazard 
domains identified, the Bayesian networks (BNs) constructed to 
explore the hierarchal structure and relationship of the hazards, 
and the final expert-derived estimates of risk associated with the 
release of the modified Ae. aegypti in Australia. In addition, we 
list recommendations for developing risk analyses, which address 
novel technologies with diverse impacts.
MaTerials anD MeThODs
steps of risk analysis – Overall 
Methodology
The risk analysis for the proposed release assessed the risks 
associated with two end points: (1) that release would not occur 
within a set time frame due to logistical, regulatory, political, 
epidemiological, and community concerns, referred to as “Don’t 
Achieve Release” (DAR) and (2) that the release of the modified 
Ae. aegypti would result in more harm through impacts on the 
economy, social wellbeing and community health, future mos-
quito control effort, and/or adverse changes to the biology of the 
vector, Wolbachia or dengue viruses, in the release locations when 
compared with the current situation within a 30-year timeframe, 
known as “Cause More Harm” (CMH) (Table 1).
Following the formulation of the two end points, DAR and 
CMH, risk was assessed through four iterative stages: (i) hazard 
identification and development of a conceptual model, (ii) 
development of a predictive risk model, (iii) model scrutiny and 
update, and (iv) risk calculation. These stages were undertaken 
using various methods, including expert elicitation via work-
shops and email correspondence, and construction of a BN. 
A series of expert workshops were held in Cairns and Brisbane, 
TaBle 1 | Definition of key nodes and states for the two endpoints produced from expert workshop.
endpoint node Definition
Don’t Achieve 
Release
Logistical 
constraints
Restrictions in achieving release due to insufficient numbers of mosquitoes to release, insufficient funding to support activities, unfit 
biological traits in mosquitoes, and/or an unfavorable release site caused by it not being suitable as a physical environment  
or because of epidemiological issues
Compliance Inability to comply because of political (incl. adverse or no media coverage) and/or community opposition with the community  
not engaged, formal regulatory oversight, and other oversight
Public opinion Non-acceptance of release because of political (incl. adverse or no media coverage) and/or community opposition with the 
community not engaged
Cause More 
Harm
Standard of 
public health
Release results in increased health issues by increasing dengue transmission, increasing densities or frequency of biting (nuisance 
biting), or increasing likelihood of transmitting other pathogens
Avoidance 
strategies
A change in normal public behavior to avoid contact with Ae. aegypti by increasing avoidance behavior and insecticide use or 
removing breeding sites around dwelling
Mosquito 
management 
efficacy
Reduction of the effectiveness of, or increased requirement for, mosquito control due to insufficient monitoring of any change  
in mosquito numbers, increased insecticide resistance, and a need to apply more or greater diversity of treatments
Ecology Ecological harm resulting from the release due to transfer of Wolbachia to another invertebrate or vertebrate species or an 
increase in the mosquito’s geographic range through climate tolerance or changes in host range, a broadened or changed 
ecological niche, or an increased density of mosquitoes
Economic effects Economic harm attributable to the release through an increased costs of health care, reduction in tourist numbers, decreased 
property values, and/or reducing supply of workers or increasing costs for employers
Other node definitions are listed in Table S1 in Supplementary Material.
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QLD, Australia, in 2010. Each workshop is comprised a range of 
“experts” as participants, including academics, regulatory officials, 
and community members, to obtain the broadest knowledge pos-
sible. Technical experts were identified due to their association 
with the project or as local experts with relevant expertise on 
mosquitoes, vector control, arboviruses, and public health. Non-
technical community experts and non-government organizations 
were identified through a community engagement program that 
was conducted in the proposed location of release (27).
The authors facilitated each workshop using an elicitation 
method adapted from Spetzler and von Holstein (28) and 
O’Hagan et al. (29) using breakout groups of three to four experts 
to encourage individual expert input, combined with entire group 
participation for feedback opportunity and group consensus. 
Averaging expert responses through group consensus counters 
individual variation in opinion (30) but does not account for 
outlier influence. Therefore, it took email correspondence and 
a further two workshops to reach consensus across each model.
hazard identification and Development of 
the conceptual Model
The first step in any risk analysis is to identify all hazards asso-
ciated with an event. An initial workshop was conducted with 
technical experts to describe all potential risks or hazards that 
may result from the proposed release relevant to each endpoint. 
The initial step elicited expert judgment from researchers associ-
ated with the Grand Challenges in Global Health (GCGH) initia-
tive during a 2-h brain storming and hazard mapping session on 
May 20, 2009. Participants were provided the two end points and 
asked to describe relevant types of potential hazard under general 
categories before identifying specific hazards for each. Second, 
additional hazards of concern to the proposed release locations 
were elicited through the GCGH’s public engagement program 
through community seminars and media (27, 31).
Development of the Predictive risk Model
A BN was used as the model structure to determine the risk of the 
end points using the information derived from the experts. A BN 
is an influence diagram that depicts logical or causal relationships 
of factors that can influence the likelihood of an outcome of a 
parameter (32). The BN influence diagram consists of a graph 
(network) with a set of connected nodes (representing hazards), 
where directed connections from “parent” nodes leading to a 
“child” node indicate a causal influence of the parent node(s) on 
the child node. Each node is discretized into categories (states) 
defining the range or value of information represented in each state 
for each node (33). Underlying each child node is a conditional 
probability table (CPT) that defines the dependencies between 
the parent nodes and their associated states (34). The likelihood 
of each state for each child node is updated when values for a 
parent node are specified (by expert estimates or empirical data). 
We used Netica 4.12 (35) to develop and compile the BN.
Experts were invited to critique the model structure of the BN 
and edit accordingly by adding, removing, or modifying nodes 
(hazards). Experts also formulated the definitions for the nodes 
and their associated states. Once the model structure was agreed 
upon, experts were asked to estimate the conditional probabilities 
for each combination of states possible under each child node. 
Subsequent discussion by email and two further workshops 
with experts resulted in consensus for the final BN models and 
underlying CPTs.
Model analysis and sensitivity analysis
We ran sensitivity analysis within Netica 4.12 to examine the 
influence of each node on the two end points. Sensitivity analysis 
TaBle 2 | scale for risk used for calculating the risk associated with the two endpoints.
scale negligible Very low low Moderate high Very high
Probability 0–0.01 0.02–0.10 0.11–0.30 0.31–0.74 0.75–0.94 0.95–1.0
Risk was calculated as a product of the likelihood of an event happening and the consequence of an event happening.
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in Netica uses entropy reduction (the expected decrease in uncer-
tainty of the node being queried due to information at the parent 
node) to determine how “sensitive” a model is to the changes in 
model variables (36). Hence, if prior findings or “priors,” such as 
knowledge from an expert’s experience, are supplied about the 
state of a parent node, this may reduce the maximum range of 
uncertainty around the likelihood distribution of the output child 
node (35, 37). Sensitivity analysis can also show how influential 
each parent node is toward its associated child node. This is 
determined by the likelihoods given in the CPTs populated by 
the experts.
Uncertainty was reduced by continually incorporating new 
information from emerging research as “findings” when it 
became available, approaching all potential experts for participa-
tion, educating all participating experts regarding the model lan-
guage, jointly developing definitions for each of the model nodes 
and associated states, and having an independent committee 
overseeing each stage of the risk analysis. Email correspondence 
and further workshops with technical experts were conducted to 
address a number of issues, including reducing the uncertainty 
around nodes by narrowing their expected distributions (e.g., 
uncertainty range changes from 0.1–0.9 to 0.4–0.6 when new 
knowledge reduced the uncertainty around a variable). In the 
final workshop, experts were asked to come to a group consensus 
through discussion of the merits of the current individual likeli-
hoods for each node and adjusting where necessary, thus reducing 
the uncertainty through group experience.
risk calculation
Risk was calculated by combining the probability or likelihood 
of an event occurring (or not occurring) and the impact or con-
sequences of that event occurring (or not occurring). Hence, we 
considered the likelihood of not achieving release and that the 
event will cause more harm, as well as the consequences if these 
events occurred. Estimates for both likelihood and consequence 
were elicited from the technical experts for calculation of risk. 
These estimates were multiplied together to give a risk value. 
A scale was determined with experts to rank risk from negligible 
to very high (Table 2). These were combined into a risk matrix, 
which corresponded with the risk value.
resUlTs
hazard identification and Development of 
the conceptual Model
Fifty-two possible hazards associated with the release of the 
modified Ae. aegypti were initially identified at the first GCGH 
session across 13 categories, including regulatory compliance, 
community acceptance, and adverse public health effects, beyond 
that already caused by naturally occurring Ae. aegypti. The expert 
workshops further identified additional hazards. After work-
shops, consultations and community engagement, a total of 109 
hazards were identified and defined (Supplementary Material). 
After removing hazards that were beyond the scope of the end 
points, the remaining hazards were refined by grouping similar 
hazards into themes: (i) logistics, compliance, and public opinion 
for DAR (comprising 18 nodes) and (ii) ecological impact, eco-
nomic impact, mosquito management, social behavior changes, 
and public health impacts for CMH (comprising 30 nodes).
Predictive risk Model
The hazard themes provided a BN framework for the endpoints, 
which was critiqued and modified by experts to best reflect 
causal relationships of each hazard (defined in Table 1). Experts 
estimated the likelihoods to populate each parent node. The CPTs 
are provided in Tables S1–S20 in Supplementary Material.
Overall, the conditional probability that the release would 
not occur on time due to a hazard failure was estimated at 45.9% 
(moderate likelihood) (Figure  1). Sensitivity analysis revealed 
DAR was the most sensitive to the “compliance” node (>60%), 
which was in turn strongly influenced by the “formal regulatory 
oversight” (45%) and to a lesser extent the “community” (20%) 
and “political” (7%) nodes (Figure 2). “Public opinion” (15%) was 
sensitive to the “community,” and the “logistical constraints” node 
was sensitive to the “release site,” which was in turn influenced by 
“epidemiological issues.”
The probability that some forms of additional harm could 
eventuate over a 30-year time frame from the date of release was 
12.5% (Figure 3). Sensitivity analysis (Figure 4) revealed CMH 
was most sensitive to the “efficacy of mosquito management” 
(18%), which in turn was influenced strongly by “household 
control.” “Standard of public health” (10%) had some influence, 
followed by “economic effects” (6%) and “avoidance strategies” 
(4%) nodes. The node “Ecology” had little effect. “Standard of 
public health” was strongly affected by “dengue transmission,” 
which in turn was heavily influenced by “dengue evolution.” 
Change in “tourism” had the strongest effect on the “economic 
effects” node (Figure 4).
Model Updating
Owing to the technical nature of the research and the use 
of a range of experts from different backgrounds and their 
varied knowledge of the project, different types and levels 
of uncertainty were evident (Murray et  al., in preparation). 
Uncertainty arose from a number of sources, including linguistic 
interpretation of the hazard definitions (Table  1). Uncertainty 
was particularly apparent around knowledge gaps and when 
experts were unfamiliar with terminology, techniques, and the 
modeling process. Uncertainty was typically evident by a broad 
FigUre 1 | Bayesian belief network for the endpoint “Don’t achieve release.” Each node (box) and the states within nodes are described in Table 1 and 
Table S1 in Supplementary Material. Probabilities for terminal nodes are determined by expert estimates. Parent nodes are represented in yellow.
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distribution between low and high values in elicited likelihoods 
(e.g., event will occur between the range of 0.1 and 0.9 likeli-
hood). Reducing uncertainty narrows the range of possible likeli-
hoods. Throughout the workshops and correspondence, experts 
were continually encouraged to provide updates on any new 
data arising from research currently underway and work toward 
consensus and removing any divergence and outliers. Effort was 
also invested in educating experts to reach a common linguistic 
understanding of node definitions. Models were continually 
updated when consensus was reached or new knowledge became 
available. For example, new information was released to reduce 
the uncertainty around infecting non-target species and feeding 
on other hosts (38).
risk calculation
Consensus of expert opinion on the endpoint for DAR resulted 
in a low likelihood (0.20) and a moderate consequence (0.35), 
ensuing DAR to be of very low risk (Table 3). “Biological traits” 
that were not suitable, a compromised “facility” and “insufficient 
numbers to release,” had high consequence but a very low likeli-
hood, resulting in very low risk. This was the same level of risk 
for “insufficient funding,” which had a very high consequence 
but negligible likelihood. “Public opinion,” “community compli-
ance,” “political,” “media,” “physical environment,” and “other 
processes” had negligible risk. The remaining nodes had very 
low risk except for problems encountered with “colony rearing,” 
which had a high consequence and low likelihood resulting in 
low risk (Table 3).
Consensus of expert opinion on the endpoint for CMH resulted 
in a very low likelihood (0.10) and a very low consequence (0.10), 
ensuing CMH to be of negligible risk (Table  4). Community 
“perceptions” had the highest risk with moderate likelihood (0.50) 
and moderate consequences (0.4) combined to render low risk. 
Community “perceptions” directly affected “household control.” 
However, “household control,” along with “avoidance strategies,” 
“mosquito density,” and “Wolbachia fitness,” had low likelihood 
and moderate consequence leading to very low risk. The remaining 
nodes relevant to CMH had negligible associated risk (Table 4).
DiscUssiOn
Overall risk
Managing risk is an important component in most research 
and management endeavors. A risk analysis was undertaken on 
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the proposal to release Wolbachia-infected Ae. aegypti in North 
Queensland, Australia, to reduce the transmission of dengue. 
Risk analysis considers the adverse potential outcomes that could 
eventuate from an event. Thus, we were only interested in whether 
release was not achieved and whether additional harm may result 
from this process. The risk assessment revealed that there was a 
higher likelihood of the project not achieving release than causing 
more harm, although the risk for both were very low. The potential 
risk for CMH was primarily influenced by the efficacy of alternative 
mosquito management actions, and the potential risk of DAR was 
mainly affected by whether regulatory compliance was obtained.
Don’t achieve release
Regulatory compliance, either formal or informal, was considered 
a hazard because of potential delay in the approval for the release 
and, hence, the release not being achieved within the designated 
timeframe. Compliance, in turn, was affected by the lack of for-
mal regulatory oversight. The novelty of the proposed release was 
reflected in the initial failure to identify an appropriate regulatory 
body, which would accept governance over the proposed release 
and prescribe an appropriate risk analysis framework. Genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs) are controlled by regulatory struc-
tures (39). Notably, the modified Ae. aegypti was determined 
not to be a GMO by the relevant organization [The Office of 
the Gene Technology Regulator (OGTR)] on the basis that the 
method of modification did not involve recombinant technol-
ogy. Nonetheless, the decision was made to use the OGTR risk 
analysis framework for GMOs (40) as best practice in the absence 
of regulatory guidance. In addition, an independent panel of local 
and international experts in risk analysis, biological control, and 
FigUre 3 | Bayesian belief network for the endpoint “cause More harm.” Each node (box) and the states within nodes are described in Table 1 and  
Table S1 in Supplementary Material. Probabilities for terminal nodes are determined by experts. Parent nodes are represented in yellow.
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regulation were convened to oversee the methods used. The 
complete risk analysis was made publicly available and used to 
support the search for a regulator. This is an unusual situation 
as the risk analysis was completed before a regulator, and their 
requirements had been identified. Furthermore, an unusual 
regulatory solution was eventually found with the consideration 
of Wolbachia as a veterinary chemical substance governed under 
existing legislation (23).
The risk that public opinion may prevent release was also 
considered influential as it was difficult to preempt the community 
response to the project, and community engagement was considered 
vital for project success. To address this risk, long-term research had 
been conducted using an engagement strategy and communication 
materials specific to the local sociopolitical context for the com-
munities at the release sites. Information sessions were run for the 
community, discussing past control methods for dengue and their 
limitations, the fundamentals of the project, and the expectations 
regarding outcomes of the project. The communities were involved 
and their concerns addressed at every step, enabling a reduction in 
the risk of opposition to the project (27, 31).
cause More harm
Causing more harm was considered a negligible risk. The 
greatest concern was whether general “mosquito management 
efficacy” would be maintained or if it was potentially reduced 
by households decreasing their efforts of mosquito control. As 
a consequence of the local population considering the threat 
of dengue transmission to be reduced following the release of 
w Ae. aegypti, residents may decrease efforts to minimize mos-
quito breeding around their home. This concern highlights the 
potential need for more effort and education directed toward 
the community to ensure that ongoing mosquito management 
is maintained at the household level (41, 42). Cliff and Campbell 
(43) also considered it was important to include perceptions, 
particularly behavioral intent and concern, within a biosecurity 
risk assessment to provide a more effective and efficient under-
standing of risk.
The standard of public health was also of some concern due 
to the potential risk of the release causing possible evolution of 
the dengue viruses to become a greater threat to public health. 
However, the likelihood of this occurring was deemed low by the 
technical experts. While Bennett et al. (44) suggest that dengue 
virus evolution can occur rapidly, the experts agreed that there is 
little evidence that the presence of Wolbachia in the mosquito will 
increase this risk, especially as evolutionary dynamics can only 
occur when the virus is transmitted successfully. In this case, the 
Wolbachia infection itself reduces the likelihood that transmis-
sion will occur (22).
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expert elicitation
Releasing mosquitoes into the environment, in this case around 
human habitation, affects local communities where the release sites 
are targeted. This necessitates the involvement of the community 
through the whole process, from providing information sessions 
and literature (27) to inclusion in expert panels. Community 
experts were able to provide valuable contribution to assessing 
the likelihoods describing the economic effects and avoidance 
strategies for CMH. Community experts were also encouraged 
to participate in populating the other nodes but found them to be 
irrelevant to their personal experiences or difficult to understand 
the technicalities underlying the other nodes.
Because of the novelty of the technique, scientific experts 
were needed to populate technical nodes, such as ecology, 
dengue transmission, and Wolbachia fitness. The complexity of 
the model required a number of workshops to obtain full under-
standing and consensus for the different technical components 
of the model, especially those describing dengue evolution and 
Wolbachia fitness.
risk analysis Methodology
The four stages of the risk analysis were necessary to accommo-
date the complexity of the events being modeled and the uncer-
tainty that arose from considering such innovative techniques 
TaBle 4 | risk matrix depicting the risk associated with cause More harm.
consequence
negligible Very low low Moderate high Very high
li
ke
lih
o
o
d
negligible Negligible risk Negligible risk Negligible risk Negligible risk Negligible risk
Labor availability
Very low risk
Dengue vector 
competence
Vertebrate 
transmission
Real estate
Standard of public 
health
Ecology
Geographical range
Health care
Host preference
Insecticide resistance
Invertebrate transfer
Very low Negligible risk Negligible risk Negligible risk Negligible risk
Density
Ecological niche
Feeding frequency
Mosquito management 
efficacy
Need for control
Very low risk Low risk
Cause More Harm Dengue evolution
Dengue transmission
Non-dengue vector 
competence
Other pathogens
Tourism
Economic effects
Nuisance biting
low Negligible risk Negligible risk Negligible risk 
Monitoring
Very low risk Low risk Moderate risk
Avoidance strategies
Household control
Mosquito density
Wolbachia fitness
Moderate Negligible risk Negligible risk Very low risk Low risk Moderate risk High risk
Perceptions
high Negligible risk Very low risk Low risk Moderate risk High risk Extreme risk
Very high Negligible risk Very low risk Low risk Moderate risk High risk Extreme risk
Risk was calculated as the product of likelihood × consequence and ranked according to the categories in Table 2.
TaBle 3 | risk matrix depicting the risk associated with Don’t achieve release.
consequence
negligible Very low low Moderate high Very high
li
ke
lih
o
o
d
negligible Negligible risk Negligible risk Negligible risk Negligible risk Negligible risk Very low risk
Funding
Very low Negligible risk Negligible risk Negligible risk Negligible risk Very low risk Low risk
Public opinion Other processes Media Biological traits
Political Physical environment Sufficient numbers to release
Facility
low Negligible risk Negligible risk Negligible risk Very low risk Low risk Moderate 
riskCommunity 
compliance
Community engagement Colony rearing
Don’t Achieve Release
Formal regulatory oversight
Logistical constraints
Release site
Epidemiological issues
Moderate Negligible risk Negligible risk Very low risk Low risk Moderate risk High risk
high Negligible risk Very low risk Low risk Moderate risk High risk Extreme risk
Very high Negligible risk Very low risk Low risk Moderate risk High risk Extreme risk
Risk was calculated as the product of likelihood × consequence and ranked according to the categories in Table 2.
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(Murray et al., in preparation). This stepwise process provided 
an opportunity to collect feedback on model structure and 
relationships and reduce the uncertainty around nodes captured 
in the risk model. The brainstorming enabled all hazards to be 
identified and be sorted into appropriate themes directed toward 
each negative endpoint. Once hazards were identified and the 
model structure determined, BNs provided opportunity for 
recording likelihoods of events. It was important to minimize 
unnecessary complexity and keep models simple, wherever pos-
sible (45). Careful editing of models can include hazard grouping 
to represent overall relationships and removing rare or irrelevant 
hazards to allow streamlining of the model structure. The BNs 
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can capture complex interactions between different hazards in 
a simplified and intuitive way. When involving non-technical 
community experts, it is especially important to provide them 
with a platform that encourages understanding with limited 
prior knowledge.
When estimating risk, capturing the likelihoods of an event 
is only half the story. An event may have a high likelihood of 
occurring but the consequences of that event may be minimal. 
Hence, combining the BN likelihood results with the associated 
consequences within a matrix provided a realistic estimate of the 
risk associated with that event (46–48). For example, “community 
perceptions” of dengue control had the highest risk for CMH, but 
this was still considered a low risk due to a minimal consequence 
of this outcome.
limitations
In this assessment, expert’s opinion was used to provide likeli-
hoods of hazard failures as a surrogate for incomplete or absent 
data, but this approach has limitations. For example, expert 
judgment is based on observation and experience, which 
varies both between and within the research and community 
representatives (49). How individuals perceive and quantify 
numerical risk also varies (50). Uncertainty was evident in dif-
ferent forms [including variability and epistemic and linguistic 
uncertainty (29, 51)] and although steps were taken to minimize 
its effect, in some cases, these efforts may have enhanced it. For 
example, the hazard definitions were intended to be succinct and 
accessible to both science and community representatives and 
included a glossary of key terms to avoid vagueness (Table 1; 
Supplementary Material). However, the elicitation exercise sent 
via email was notable for the linguistic difficulty some respond-
ents experienced regarding the definitions – particularly if they 
had not participated in the earlier stages of model development. 
This manifested as highly divergent hazard scoring (broad ranges 
or outliers) and in some cases a lack of confidence in assigning 
a likelihood estimate to a hazard. The inability to easily discuss 
aspects, such as definitions and reach consensus on interpreta-
tion, and the occasionally low response rates are failings of this 
individual-focused remote approach (52). However, the value of 
an individual approach lies in the fact that a set of estimates from 
prior knowledge (known as “priors”) can be rapidly obtained 
without group influence. Individual priors may represent more 
breadth of knowledge than priors determined through group 
consensus. The last expert workshop was designed in response 
to these issues with an aim to reduce uncertainty and obtain a 
consensus set of priors, which adequately reflected individual 
expert opinion. The priors also represent a baseline for examina-
tion of the likelihoods of hazard failure and the consequences 
of failure. These priors can be updated when new information 
becomes available to further inform expert estimates or when 
new data can be used to replace expert estimates. For instance, 
where robust scientific data from laboratory testing are available 
on horizontal transfer rates, it may be more accurate than the 
equivalent expert opinion.
Risk matrices have been used extensively in risk analysis and 
management but suffer some limitations. Cox (53) notes that risk 
matrices can have poor resolution by only comparing a fraction 
of hazard pairs, can erroneously assign higher risks to qualitative 
rather than quantitative risks, and can lead to ambiguous inputs 
and outputs if consequences are uncertain. During our risk analy-
sis process, we endeavored to counter these limitations. Using 
BNs allowed the modeling of interactions between all associated 
risks so all hazards, and their potential codependent hazards are 
accounted for within the risk matrix. The BNs were also popu-
lated entirely by expert elicitation; therefore, quantitative data 
were not used. However, we continually sought feedback from 
experts to ensure that the latest knowledge and understanding 
was captured in the models. Lastly, we chose technical experts 
with great expertise within the field to quantify consequences 
both individually and as a group.
While it is difficult to test and validate risk assessment 
models, the model results informed the independent scientific 
committee and the regulatory body who subsequently approved 
the project. Post-project results showed that the project mem-
bers were able to overcome any potential risks for DAR by 
successfully producing the modified Ae. aegypti populations 
for the designated release timeframe (23). Wolbachia-infected 
mosquito populations to date have also been successfully estab-
lished into their natural environment around the release sites 
(54). However, risks associated with CMH need to be monitored 
over the next 30 years.
cOnclUsiOn
The risk analysis highlighted factors that needed to be addressed 
before the release of Wolbachia-infected mosquitoes could occur. 
It also highlighted the uncertainty that arises from innovative 
research and the employment of expert opinion to populate 
models. We make the following five recommendations:
•	 Overall community engagement and media coverage need to 
play a significant role in obtaining project approval, especially 
if there are direct implications to the community.
•	 Inclusion of both technical and non-technical community 
experts captures the diversity of opinions relevant to different 
hazards. This is especially important when community sup-
port is essential.
•	 An iterative model continually updated with new knowledge 
can help reduce the uncertainty associated with risks as well as 
highlight where new research is needed to clarify issues.
•	 As in this case, innovative research may not be covered 
by existing regulatory bodies and this may lead to delays. 
Understanding this early can provide an opportunity and time 
for project managers to find solutions.
•	 Understanding the role that individual and community percep-
tions play when introducing new technology for which there is 
no prior example of application is very important, particularly 
when modeling future human behavior. In this case, intro-
ducing this technology may have led to individuals believing 
the dengue threat had been alleviated and thus reducing the 
amount of household mosquito control they conduct. Thus, 
adopting ethical public participation and engagement sessions 
to both inform and answer direct questions from members of 
the community can reduce this risk (27, 42, 55).
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